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These two cases will lay down a binding rule for national banks and the
lower federal courts, and it is hoped, by the writer, that this declaration by
the highest court in the land will carry sufficient weight to persuade state
courts to take a like view. S. E. M.
Constitutional Law--Presumptions of Fact. Appellant was tried for
murder. During the course of the trial the state was permitted to prove that
appellant did not have a permit to carry a pistol or revolver. Appellant was
convicted and appealed. Appellee, in its brief called attention to Sec. 8025,
Burns' Ann. St. 1926, which reads: "In the trial of a person charged with
committing or attempting to commit a felony against the person or property
of another while armed with a pistol or revolver, without having a permit to
carry such firearm as hereinbefore provided, the fact that such person was so
armed shall be prima facie evidence of his intent to commit such felony."
Although this was not embodied in an instruction below and appellant does
not complain that it was read to the jury in argument, appellee urges that
evidence of the fact that appellant did not have a permit was competent on
the question of intent and that its proof established a prima facie case of
felonious intent. Held, evidence inadmissible and prejudicial and the statute
is beyond the power of the legislature.'
The court is clearly correct in its decision regarding the admission of evi-
dence to the effect that the appellant had no permit to carry a firearm. Carry-
ing a concealed weapon, though an offense in itself, is not a material element
of the crime of murder,2 nor does the mere carrying of a revolver without a
permit render a defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter. 3
The general rule is well established that it is competent for a legislative
body to provide by statute that certain facts shall be prima facie or presump-
tive evidence of other facts, if there is a natural and rational evidentiary rela-
tion between the facts proved and those presumed. 4 Such statutes are prop-
erly regarded as rules of procedure, changing the burden of proof and do not
contravene the constitutional provisions for due process of law.5 The oppo-
site party must not be denied the right to rebut the presumption in some fair
manner accorded by rules of law or procedure. 6
On the other hand, the legislature cannot constitutionally make one fact
conclusive evidence of another material fact in controversy, if the former is
not, in and of itself, by virtue of its own force, conclusive, unless the statute
may be regarded as declaring a rule of substantive law, dispensing with cer-
tain elements in the chain of proof necessary to establish a case-in which
case the legislature would be making a new crime.7 Such a statute would be
arbitrary and have no relevancy to the facts already proved or those necessary
to be proved.
In many cases statutes making certain facts presumptive evidence of other
facts are very desirable as eliminating from the state's burden of proof mat-
ters that are almost taken for granted, but the proof of which would be con-
siderable burden upon the state and of no practical aid or defense to the
accused. The accused has his right to show that the inference to be made
1 Powers v. State (Ind. Sup. Feb. 20, 1933), 184 N. E. 549.
2 Males v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 196, 156 N. E. 403.
3 Potter v. State (1904), 162 Ind. 213, 70 N. E. 129, 64 L. R. A. 942, 102 Am. St.
Rep. 198, 1 Ann. Cas. 32.
4 Hawes v. Georgia (1922), 258 U. S. 1, 66 L. Ed. 431.
5 Chicago Terminal Transfer Co. v. Chicago (1905), 217 Ill. 343, 75 N. E. 499.
6 Goldstein v. Maloney (1911), 62 Fla. 198, 57 So. 342.
7 In re Buchanan (1918), 184 App. Div. 237, 171 N. Y. S. 708; Voght v. State (1890),
124 Ind. 358, 24 N. E. 680; Darbyshire v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 608, 149 N. E. 166;
People v. Falkovitch (1917), 280 Ill. 321, 117 N. E. 398, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1077, 16
A. L. R. 916; People v. Camberis (1921), 297 Ill. 455, 130 N. E. 712, 16 A. L. R. 916,
Meyer v. Berlahdi (1888), 39 Minn. 438, 40 N. W. 513.
RECENT CASE NOTES
by the statute is not the proper inference in this case, and the facts are gen-
erally more within his control than within the control of the prosecution.
Some of the more common of these situations are:
Various cases sustain the constitutionality of statutes making a failure of
a bank under certain circumstances prima facie evidence of knowledge on the
part of the banker that the institution was insolvent at the time of the receipt
of deposits or of an intent to defraud.8
Possession of gambling devices has been made prima facie evidence of
crime. 9 And an ordinance may provide that a person found in a gambling
house shall be presumed to be there for the purpose of gambling unless it .is
shown to the contrary. 10 A statute making renting a room for gambling
purposes a crime is constitutional which provides that it is sufficient evidence
of the fact if gaming is actually carried on with knowledge of the owner or
under such circumstances as he ought to know."
Statutes declaring the delivery of intoxicating liquors shall be prima facie
proof of a sale, and that a sale shall be prima facie proof of illegality are
constitutional. 12 The legislature may provide that the destruction of liquor by
a tenant during search is prima facie proof that it is intoxicating liquor and
intended for unlawful sale. 13 Proof of possession of intoxicating liquors is
a prima facie case of illegality. 14
A statute is valid which creates a speed limit in towns and makes speeds
in excess thereof prima facie negligent.13 Such a statute cannot be conclu-
sive, however, and in the absence of something further on the question of
negligence cannot sustain a conviction in the case of an accident alleged to
have been caused by criminal negligence since the defendant must be shown
actually guilty of criminal negligence. 16
Statutory provisions intended to protect proprietors of hotels and similar
places in obtaining payment for accommodations, through making certain
facts prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud are constitutional. Surrep-
titious removal of baggage from a hotel without payment; giving in payment
of a check or draft on which payment was refused; obtaining accommodations
by false or fictitious show of baggage-are prima facie evidence of fraudulent
intent.17
The legislature thus has the power to make, in many cases, proof of cer-
tain matters prima facie proof of other matters which have a close and defi-
nite relation thereto. However, the instant case strictly limits the power of
the legislature in this respect as regards proof necessary to sustain a convic-
tion for a crime or criminal intent. "Before a proven fact can constitute
prima facie evidence of criminal intent, it must be sufficient evidence of itself
to sustain a conviction without support of statutory enactment."' 8 Such a
restriction is necessary since any other rule would require the defendant to
prove himself innocent regardless that the evidence against him without such
statutory presumption was insufficient to sustain a conviction. P. C. R.
8 State v. Beach (1897), 147 Ind. 74, 43 N. E. 949, and cases cited.
9 Adams v. N. Y. (1904), 192 U. S. 585, 48 L. Ed. 575.
10 People v. Baum (1909), 133 App. Div. 481, 118 N. Y. S. 3.
11 Morgan v. State (1888), 117 Ind. 569, 19 N. E. 154; Voght v. State (1890), 124
Ind. 358, 24 N. E. 680.
12 Com. v. Wallace (1851), 7 Gray (Mass.) 222; State v. Higgins (1876), 13 R. I.
330; State v. Thomas (1880), 47 Conn. 546.
13 Darbyshire v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 608, 149 N. E. 166.
14 Rose v. State (1908), 171 Ind. 662, 87 N. E. 103.
15 Smith v. State (1917), 186 Ind. 252, 115 N. E. 943.
16 People v. Falkovitch (1917), 280 IIl. 321, 117 N. E. 398, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1077,
16 A. L. R. 916; People v. Camberis (1921), 297 Ill. 455, 130 N. E. 712, 16 A. L. R. 916.
17 Smith v. State (1914), 141 Ga. 482, 81 S. E. 220, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 999; State v.
Kingsley (1891), 108 Mo. 135, 18 S. W. 994.
is Powers v. State (1933), 184 N. E. 549 at 552.
